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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RALPH L. CONK,
PlaintiffAppellant,

v.

Case No. 16227

WALLACE L. CHAMBERS, M.D.
and GRANGER MEDICAL CLINIC,
a corporation,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action in which the
plaintiff claims damages incident to renal failure following an intestinal by-pass procedure for obesity.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which returned a
unanimous verdict in favor of defendants and against the
plaintiff, no cause of action.

Judgment on the verdict

was entered on November 30, 1977.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants object to plaintiff's statement of facts
which is incomplete, argumentative and violative of the
well-established principle that evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be fairly drawn therefrom must
be viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict
and judgment entered thereon.
(Utah 1976);

Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619

Paull v. Zions First Nat'l. Bank, 18

183, 417 P.2d 759

(1966).

Utah~

Accordingly, defendants submit

their own statement of facts.
The parties will be described as they appeared in
the trial court.
In March of 197 3, the plaintiff presented himself to
Dr. Wallace Chambers, a Board-certified specialist in
•

• a'

surgery, and requested the defendant to perform an intestin ·
by-pass procedure for treatment of the plaintiff's obesity
and hypertension of long standing duration.

(R. 767, 7901
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Mr. Conk had been under the care of specialists in internal
medicine at the Granger Medical Clinic for treatment of
exogenous obesity and hypertension since 1965 and sought
surgical treatment for his condition at the suggestion of
his physicians.

(R. 1106, 1133, 992-93, 789)

The intestinal by-pass procedure had been developed
and used for more than twenty-five years as a surgical
method to achieve weight loss in extremely obese patients.
(R. 1197)

The procedure itself involves removal of a

large segment of the small intestine from the alimentary
canal to reduce the area in which absorption of nutrients
occurs.

The "by-passed" segment of intestine remains

intact in the abdominal cavity and can be reconnected
should the need arise.

During the 1960's, extensive

studies with hundreds of patients had been conducted and
reported in the medical literature.

Although there was

wide diversity among surgeons as to the optimum lengths
of intestine to be left in the digestive tract, the procedure was considered safe and appropriate treatment for
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morbid obesity.

(R. 820-21, 1207-08, 1197-98)

Dr.

Chambers had studied the procedure for several years
and had consulted with another expert in Philadelphia
before he performed his first by-pass operation in 1968.
(R. 783-85)
When Dr. Chambers first examined the plaintiff,
Mr. Conk was fifty years old, weighed 336 pounds and,
although taking medications to control hypertension, had
(R. 977, 1167)

a blood pressure of 180/112.

His records

from prior years indicated that he had weighed as much u
344 pounds and that his blood pressure had reached systolic
levels of 204 and diastolic levels of 130.

(R. 1133, 11191

He exhibited shortness of breaih while at rest and had a
skin color evidencing poor oxygenation which are indications of a "Pickwickian syndrome" often found in the
morbidly obese.

(R. 1160-67, 1201-02)

Blood tests re-

vealed elevated levels of blood fats which are associat~
with cardio-vascular diseases.

(R. 1163)

Years of elevate

blood pressure had also caused structural changes in t~
small blood vessels of the plaintiff's kidneys, a conditio:

-4-
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known as hypertensive nephrosclerosis, which had caused
minute amounts of protein to spill into the urine on three
occasions before Dr. Chambers' initial examination.
57, 1261-63)

(R. 1256-

Experts for the plaintiff and for the defendants

agreed that the plaintiff's obesity, hypertension and related
problems prior to surgery were of such severity that, were
he not treated, Mr. Conk would be expected to live only a
few years.

(R. 433, 1164, 913)

Although the plaintiff was

already acquainted with the operation because Dr. Chambers
had performed an identical procedure on Mr. Conk's daughter
approximately one month earlier, Dr. Chambers thoroughly
reviewed the procedure with Mr. Conk, using diagrams as
illustrations.

(R. 992, 819)

Dr. Chambers advised Mr. Conk that the procedure would
be major surgery and would be "very dangerous" during the
immediate post-operative period.

(R. 1057, 1059, 819)

Dr. Chambers told the plaintiff that he might not survive
the surgery as the operation had an 8% mortality rate.
(R. 1059-60, 802)

He was also told that he could expect
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to have severe diarrhea and nausea for a prolonged period of
time and that his liver would be seriously damaged if he
ever consumed alcohol.

(R. 819, 994)

Mr. Conk was also

informed that he would receive injections and oral medications for at least two years to replace vitamins and

min~~

that would not be absorbed naturally due to the by-pass.
(R. 994)

Finally, Dr. Chambers informed the plaintiff that

the technique he intended to use was new and that, in Dr.
Chambers' opinion, the operation should be considered
"experimental."

(R. 788, 1061-62)

Before agreeing to perform the procedure, Dr. Chambers
also questioned the plaintiff concerning methods of weight
control and therapy for hypertension Mr. Conk had previously
undertaken to determine if alternatives to surgery ought to
be tried.

(R. 804)

Mr. Conk testified that he considered

himself to be a very light eater and admitted that he had
never been able to lose weight by dieting despite twenty
years of urging from every physician who had treated him.
(R. 1041, 1047-48)

During the years, Mr. Conk had tried
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various medications to suppress his appetite, but had
found them to have undesireable side effects, including
exacerbation of his hypertension.

(R. 1046-47)

The

plaintiff also had learned of, but rejected, a weight
reduction program whereby the patient's jaws are wired
shut.

(R. 1046-47)

The plaintiff was unable to control

his hypertension because of his extreme weight and because
he failed to take, regularly and faithfully, the medications his physicians had prescribed.

(R. 1129, 1139-40)

In sununary, Mr. Conk's previous efforts to lose weight
and to control his hypertension through diet and medication were unsuccessful' despite warnings from his physicians
that he was "killing himself" by not following their
instructions.

(R. 1129, 1139-40)

At the time he con-

sulted Dr. Chambers, the plaintiff admitted he was fearful,
and justifiably so, of suffering a "stroke."

(R. 1042)

After confirming that he was an appropriate candidate
for intestinal by-pass, Dr. Chambers admitted the plaintiff
to the Valley West Hospital on April 21, 1973 for pre-
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operative tests with the expectation of performing the
procedure on April 23, 1973.

(R. 224)

A complete

battery of blood and urinalysis tests were performed,
together with an electrocardiogram, chest x-rays and
complete physical, which showed that the plaintiff was
in fit and proper condition to undergo the contemplated
surgery.

(R. 1163, 833)

Of particular importance to

this action were tests which revealed perfectly normal
renal function.

(R. 824, 116 3)

The by-pass procedure was performed without incident
on April 23, 1973 and the plaintiff had an excellent
post-operative course.

(R. 1145)

Dr. Chambers examined

the plaintiff on a monthly basis following the operation
and noted a steady loss in weight and a satisfactory
reduction in blood pressure to normal and near normal
levels.

(R. 889, 814-15)

Mr. Conk returned to work forty

to sixty days after the operation and continued on what
Dr. Chambers observed to be a totally satisfactory recow0·
(R. 996, 1173, 1160, 1155)

' 'ff
After five months, the pla1nt1
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reported no complaints, except for fatigue, and was pleased
with the results of the operation.

(R. 1150)

By May of

1974, the plaintiff had reached a stable weight of 244
pounds, had been "eating heavily and working hard."
(R. 1153)
On June 12, 1974, Dr. Chambers noted that the plaintiff's
general health was good, that his blood pressure was normal
and he ordered a routine battery of extensive blood tests.
(R. 1154)

The test results showed totally normal kidney

function and no abnormalities of any kind in the blood
chemistries.

(R. 1154-55)

During the remainder of 1974,

the plaintiff continued to receive monthly examinations,
reported minor ailments such as muscle cramps, fatigue and
abdominal pains, but was otherwise progressing satisfactorily.
(R. 1155-58)
In response to the plaintiff's continuing complaints
of fatigue and cramps in his legs and thighs, Dr. Chambers
ordered another battery of blood tests on December 30, 1974.
(R. 1153)

The tests again showed totally normal kidney
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function and no irregularities except for slightly low
calcium levels for which Dr. Chambers prescribed a calcium
supplement.

(R. 1158)

When the complaints of malaise or

fatigue persisted, Dr. Chambers referred the plaintiff to
a specialist in internal medicine for consul tat ion in late
February, 1975.

(R. 1160)

As of that date, there had

been no indications of any kind to suggest the possibility
of renal damage and, to the contrary, blood tests had
revealed perfectly normal kidney function.

(R. 1161)

On March 5, 1975, blood tests identical to those
performed on December 30, 1974 were repeated which revealed a sudden and dramatic change in renal function.
(R. 1170)

Within sixty-five days, kidney function had

progressed from "excellent" to advanced and
kidney failure.

(R. 1275)

irreversib~

Despite an exhaustive investi·

gation by the kidney specialists, who treated the plaintiff,
the cause of the renal failure remains unknown.

(R. 12781

There had never been a reported case of renal failure
following by-pass surgery during the time Dr. Chambers
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treated the plaintiff.

(R. 1194, 1196)

The first such

case study ever reported appeared in December, 1975, and,
at the time of trial, of the tens of thousands of by-pass
procedures performed, only two cases of renal failure were
described in the literature.

(R. 1278-79, 1285-86)

In

each of the other cases, a disease process that could not
be identified in the present action was found to have caused
the kidney damage and ultimate renal failure.

(R. 1327)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED
ON THE GENERAL VERDICT IF ONE OF THE
DETERMINATIVE ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
WAS FREE FROM ERROR AND IF THE JURY'S
FINDING ON THAT ISSUE WAS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The judgment of the lower court was entered in this
action on a general verdict of the jury in favor of the
defendants.

The plaintiff neither requested special

interrogatories on the several issues determinative of
this proceeding nor objected to the general verdict form.
In accordance with this Court's long-standing presumption
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of validity in favor of the verdict of the jury and the
judgment entered thereon, the Court must presume that
the jury found all issues of liability in favor of the
defendants.

Accordingly, if one of the issues submitted

to the jury was free from error and if the jury's finding
on that issue was supported by substantial evidence, the
judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.
This Court has long recognized a presumption of
validity in favor of all aspects of a verdict challenged
on appeal.

In Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R. Co., 3 Utah 2d

247, 282 P.2d 335 (1955), for example, the Court
the judgment of the lower

cour~

and stated:

When the court has made findings and
entered judgment thereon as was done
here, it is then our duty to review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, and they must
be allowed to stand if reasonable
minds would agree with them.
Likewise
every reasonable intendment ought to
be indulged in favor of the validity
and correctness of the judgment under
review and it will not be disturbed
unless the appellant meets his burden
of affirmatively showing error.
282 P.2d at 337 (Emphasis added)
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affirm~

Similarly, in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.
Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974), the
Court affirmed a judgment on a jury verdict and stated:
This case falls within the framework of
the fundamental principle: That what the
parties are entitled to is a fair opportunity to present their respective cases
to a court and jury for determination.
When this has been accomplished, all
presumptions favor the verity of the
verdict and the judgment; and this
includes all aspects of the conduct of
the proceedings, and rulings of the court.
552 P.2d at 1374 (Emphasis added)
See, also, Burton v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution,
122 Utah 360, 247 P.2d 514 (1952);

Evell & Son, Inc. v.

Salt Lake City Corp.; 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972);
Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965);
Dalton v. Wadley, 11 Utah 84, 355 P.2d 69 (1960).
As one aspect of the presumption in favor of a judgment, this Court, in accordance with an impressive majority
of jurisdictions throughout the country, has recognized
that when several issues determinative of an action are
submitted to the trier of fact and the basis for decision
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is unknown, it is the duty of the court to presume that
the trier of fact relied upon a proper theory and upon
proper evidence.

In McLaughlin v. Chief Consolidated

Mining Co., 220 P. 726

(Utah 1923), for example, the

Court considered a general verdict in favor of the

plai~

tiff and against the mining company in a negligence case
in which the mining company's agent was exonerated from
liability.

Rejecting the appellant's contention that

the general verdict in favor of the agent also exonerated
the principal, the Court assumed that the jury had

adopt~

a theory of liability that could properly be sustained on
appeal.

Affirming the judgment, the Court stated:
If the evidence supports the theory
that the mining company was liable
without taking into consideration
anything that [the agent] did or
said, or that he failed to do, it
is the duty of this court to assume
that the jurors adopted the theory
supported by the evidence.
220 P.
at 731 (Emphasis added)

Similarly, in Rose v. Strike, 10 Utah 2d 72, 348
563 (1960), the Court reviewed a judgment in an action
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P.U

where the trial court failed to render an opinion stating
the basis of his decision.

Noting that claims could have

been based on at least one and perhaps more theories, the
Court nevertheless affirmed stating:
[W]e will indulge ourselves in assuming
that the trial court concluded as he did
on a proper theory. The record disclosed
no request for such an opinion and no
exception to the lack of it. 348 P.2d
at 564.
The presumption applied by the Utah court to sustain a
judgment or general verdict where one, but not necessarily
all, of several counts, issues or theories submitted to
the trier of fact was free from error and supported by
substantial evidence is widely recognized and approved in
other jurisdictions as the "two issue rule."
In Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarborough, 355 So.2d 1181
(Fla. 1978), the Supreme Court of Florida recently adopted
the two issue rule as the better reasoned approach both
as a matter of policy and in view of the presumption of
validity afforded to judgments challenged on appeal.

In

that case, the plaintiff had obtained a general verdict in
an action for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.
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An intermediate appellate court sustained the judgment
upon a finding of sufficient evidence of malicious prosecution and did not address alleged errors pertaining
to the false imprisonment count.

Affirming the decision

of the intermediate court, the Supreme Court addressed
the "two issue rule" as follows:
The question arises where two or more
issues are left to the jury, and of
which [one or more] may be determinative of the case, and a general verdict
is returned, making it impossible to
ascertain the issue(s) upon which the
verdict was founded.
One line of
authority holds that reversal is improper where no error is found as to
one of the issues, as the appellant
is unable to establish that he has been
prejudiced. This is known in jurisprudence as the "two issue" rule.
It is a
rule of policy, designed to simplify the
work of the trial courts and to limit
the scope of proceedings on review.
The weight of authority to the contrary
mandates a reversal where error has
affected one issue unless it is clear
that the complaining party has not been
injured thereby.
355 So.2d at 1186
(Citations omitted)
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The Supreme Court recognized and adopted the "two issue"
rule as a better view supported by greater weight of
authority.

The Court dismissed arguments that injustice

could result from adoption of the rule because counsel
may simply request a special verdict as to each count in
a case to determine the basis for the jury's decision.
The Court therefore concluded:
Where the District Court determined under
these circumstances that one of the issues
submitted to the jury was free from prejudicial error, it will be presumed that
all issues were decided in favor of the
prevailing party and the judgment will be
affirmed.
Id.
The "two issue" rule applies equally to general
verdicts in favor of the plaintiff or in favor of the
defendant.

In Royal Homes, Inc. v. Dalene Hardwood

Flooring Co., Inc., 199 A.2d 698 (Conn. 1964), the
Court held that the failure to properly instruct the
jury with respect to one of the defendant's defenses
was harmless error because the general verdict in favor of
the defendants was presumed to be based on a second and
separate defense.

The Court stated:
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The fact that there were these two
distinct defenses brought into operation the rule expressed in Meglio v.
Corneau, 137 Conn. 551, 553, 79 A.2d
187, 188:
"The Connecticut rule may
be stated as follows:
If there is no
error in the instructions as to one
of two distinct defenses, a general
verdict for the defendant should be
sustained . . . .
To qualify under
this definition, the defenses must
be distinct.
That is the decisive
test." 199 A.2d at 700.
The "two issue" rule has been expressly adopted in
the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered
the question.

See,~.,

State Tax Commission v. Magma

Copper Co., 41 Ariz. 97, 15 P.2d 961 (1932);

Reese v.

Cradit, 12 Ariz.App. 233, 469 P.2d 467 (1970);

Berger v.

Southern Pacific Co., 144 Cal.App.2d 1, 300 P.2d 170
(1956);

Brignoli v. Seaboard Transportation Co., 171

P.2d 518, Sub. Opinion 178 P.2d 445 (Cal.App. 1947);
Messier v. Zanglis, 144 Conn. 449, 133 A.2d 619 (1957);
Meglio v. Corneau, 137 Conn. 551, 79 A.2d 187 (1951);
Whitaker v. Creedon, 99 Ga.App. 228, 108 S.E.2d 335 (1959):
Moore v. Jewel Tea co., 46 Ill.2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (19lt
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Goldschmidt v. Chicago Transit Authority, 335 Ill.App.
461, 82 N.E.2d 357;

Ohio Finance Co. v. Berry, 219 Ind.

97, 37 N.E.2d 2 (1941);

Gossett v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 208 N.C. 152, 179 S.E. 438 (1935);

Knisely v.

Community Traction Co., 125 Ohio St. 131, 180 N.E. 654
(1932);

Alexander v. Hair, 38 N.E.2d 601 (Ohio App. 1942);
~

Anderson v. West, 241 S.E.2d 551 (S.Ct. S.C. 1978);
v. Christensen, 77 S.D. 381, 92 N.W.2d 199 (1958);
v. Hogan, 40 A.2d 599 (S.Ct. R.I. 1944);

McSoley

Tenn. Cent. Ry.

v. Umenstetter, 155 Tenn. 235, 291 S.W. 452 (1927);
Clinchfield R.R. v. Forbes, 57 Tenn.App. 174, 417 S.W.2d
210 (1966).

Other states have also recognized that a jury,

by its general verdict, is pre~umed to have found all
issues in favor of the prevailing party.

~·

~.,

Armstrong v. Greshaam, 73 Colo. 46, 213 P. 114 (1923);
Ratcliff v. Murphy, 150 Mont. 31, 430 P.2d 627 (1967);
Hutchinson Lumber Co. v. Scrivener, 91 Okla. 293, 217 P.
854 (1923);

Lumbliner v. Ruge, 21 Wash. 2d 881, 153 P.2d 694

(1944).
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In the present case, the defendants advanced three
separate and distinct defenses at the time of trial:
First, that the defendants were not negligent;

second,

that any negligence was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's renal failure;

and third, that the plaintiff's

claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Since

it must be presumed that the jury found in favor of the
defendants on all three issues, each of which is dispositive of the action, the Court should affirm the general
verdict if any one of the issues can be sustained on appeal.
POINT II
THE JURY FOUND UNDER PROPER INSTRUCTIONS
AND UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT
The plaintiff asserts as grounds for reversal two
issues that relate to the defendants' conduct.

First,

the plaintiff argues that Dr. Chambers negligently failed
to obtain an informed consent and that the jury was not
properly instructed on that issue.

With respect to

informed consent, the plaintiff specifically claims that
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Dr. Chambers should have advised him that the by-pass
procedure was "experimental" and that the operation was
ill-advised because of the condition of the plaintiff's
kidneys prior to surgery.

Second, the plaintiff assails

the court's refusal to give certain instructions purporting to define the standard of care required of the
defendant.

Since the plaintiff submits no other allega-

tions of error upon which the defendant's conduct is
challenged, no additional claims will be addressed.
A.

The Defendant Disclosed All Substantial
And Significant Risks Of The Procedure
And The Jury Was Properly Instructed As
To That Issue.

This Court has previously recognized the physician's
duty to disclose to a patient the material and usual, but
not highly speculative, risks of medical treatment.
Ficklin v. MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295 (Utah 1976)

That

duty is now codified in the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act which requires physicians to inform patients of
"substantial and significant" risks of a proposed procedure.

Utah code Ann.,

§

78-14-5 (1953)

The jury correctly
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found that Dr. Chambers complied in all respects with
that duty.
The plaintiff stresses in his brief the argument
that the intestinal by-pass procedure was "experimental"
in that the medical profession by 1973 had acquired too
little knowledge to anticipate the risks attendant to
that operation.
proposition.

The jury quite properly rejected that

Dr. Daniel Hunter, an experienced Ogden

surgeon, who at the time of trial had performed 160 by-pass
operations, testified that the usual and expected results
of the procedure were known as early as 1963 when one of
the foremost proponents of the operation reported on
sixteen years of experience and follow-up with his patients.
(R. 1197)

Dr. Hunter flatly rejected the suggestion of

plaintiff's counsel that the procedure was still "experimental" when he stated:
I did not consider it experimental or
I wouldn't have been doing it in private
practice.
I considered it an operation
that had been observed for eight years,
had been tried in a large enough series
and had some expected results.
I have
found that there are some additional
problems that I have become acquainted
with as the time has gone on since I
first started doing them.
There may be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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others in the future, but this is true
whether I'm talking about gastric surgery
or colon surgery, it's true of every
phase of surgery. We are making advances.
We can't know everything about everything
that is done. We get a reasonable experience with it, and then we can start
to use it with expectation that it is
going to be an improvement in the patient's
health.
(R. 1028)
Whether the procedure was in fact "experimental" is
inconsequential in any event because the jury reasonably
concluded that the plaintiff was advised of Dr. Chambers'
opinion that the operation should be considered to be
"experimental."

Dr. Chambers testified that he so informed

the plaintiff and Mr. Conk admitted that the defendant
described the operation as "a
1062)

n~w

procedure."

(R. 788,

The matter of witness credibility, of course, falls

within the province of the jury.

As this Court stated in

Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115 (1955):
It is the duty of this court to leave
the question of credibility of witnesses to the jury or finder of fact
and we have quite consistently adhered
to that policy. As has often been said,
the jury is in a favored position to
form impressions as to the trust to be
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reposed in witnesses.
They have the
advantage of fairly close personal
contact;
the opportunity to observe
appearance and general demeanor;
and
the chance to feel the impact of personalities. All of which they may
consider in connection with the reactions, manner of expression and
apparent frankness and candor or want
of it in reacting to and answering
questions on both direct and crossexamination in determining whether,
and to what extent, witnesses are to
be believed. Whereas, the appellate
court is handicapped by being limited
to a review of an impersonal record.
284 P.2d at 1117.
See, also, Lamkin v. Lynch, Utah Supreme Ct. No. 15683
(Aug. 27, 1979).
The contention that Dr. Chambers had a duty to
inform the plaintiff of a kidn~y "problem" that was
alleged to be a contraindication to the by-pass surgery
is equally meritless.

The uncontroverted evidence was

that the plaintiff's kidney function was totally normal
immediately prior to the operation.

(R.

824, 116 3)

The

only indication prior to surgery of any abnormal kidney
condition was the presence of protein in the plaintiff's
urine that was observed on three occasions prior to surger:

-24Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R. 1256-57, 1261-63)

The specialist in kidney diseases

who treated the plaintiff testified that the incidents
of proteinuria were the result of the plaintiff's longstanding hypertension and that the condition would be
expected to improve dramatically and perhaps disappear
entirely upon a reduction in blood pressure brought
about by weight loss.

(R. 1256-57, 1261-63, 1272)

The

evidence established that the plaintiff's hypertensive
nephrosclerosis was not a contraindication to any need
of surgery and, to the contrary, the objectives of the
surgery were expected to improve the condition.

(R. 1271,

1273, 1194, 1211, 1222)
The plaintiff's challenges to the court's instructions
on informed consent likewise must fail for several reasons.
First, there was no evidence upon which to rest a claim of
lack of informed consent under any theory.

Renal failure

of the type present in this action was unknown to the
medical profession in 1973.

(R. 1194, 1278-79)

Even at

the time of trial, only two reports of renal failure had
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been published among the tens of thousands of by-pass
patients.

(R. 1278-79, 1285-86)

Under such circumstances,

as a matter of law, Dr. Chambers could not be held liable
for failing to disclose such a risk.

See, Ficklin v.

McFarlane, 550 P. 2d 1295 (Utah 1976) (concurring opinion).
It was also conclusively established that the condition of
hypertensive nephrosclerosis was not a contraindication
to surgery nor was it related in any way to the ultimate
renal failure.

(R.

1271, 1273, 1194, 1211, 1222, 1282)

In short, undisclosed "risks" of which the plaintiff
complains were never shown to be material, substantial or
usual complications of the by-pass procedure.
Second, the challenged instructions when viewed in
light of the evidence are not inherently inconsistent.
The plaintiff complains that the defendant's proffered
instruction limits the duty of disclosure to those risks
which would have been disclosed as a part of accepted
medical practice among surgeons practicing in accordance
with the applicable standard of care.

(R. 155)
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The

defendants believe that instruction correctly states the
law that exists in Utah as well as the majority of other
jurisdictions.

Cf. Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40,

347 P.2d 1108 (1959);

Anno. Modern Status of Views As to

General Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of
Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 ALR3d 1008 (1978).

In any

event, no witnesses testified nor was any contention made
that the standard of care applicable to Dr. Chambers
required less than full disclosure of any and all substantial and usual risks known to accompany the by-pass
procedure.

Accordingly, any conflict in the language of

the subject instructioni and any difference in the theories
proposed by the respective parties are wholly incensequential under the facts of this case.
B.

The Court Properly Instructed The Jury
As To The Standard Of Care Applicable
To The Defendants.

In Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978), the Court
expressly adopted the rule that a physician is held to a
standard of care that is shown to exist in that physician's

-27-
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conununity or in conununities similar to the one in which
he practices.

The rationale for adopting the "same or

similar locality" rule was stated by the Chief Justice as
follows:
[T]here is no reason to hold that
doctors in Salt Lake City who profess
to be experts in a field of surgery or
medicine should not be held to the
standard of care exercised by experts
in the same field in cities of comparable size and throughout the medical
profession.
584 P.2d at 817.
Although this action was tried in 1977, the trial
court accepted the plaintiff's requested instructions

a~

charged the jury in accordance with the same or similar
locality rule subsequently adopted in Swan.

The court's

instruction no. 14 states, in its relevant part:
You are instructed that a treating
physician and surgeon who specializes
in a field of medicine has a duty in the
diagnosis and treatment of a patient to
exercise the degree of skill exacted by
the professional standards of said
specialty in the conununity or similar
conununities wherein said specialty is
practiced. The failure of such a
specialist to treat a patient in conformity to such standards would be
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negligence.
In this connection, if you
should find and believe from a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Chambers
failed to treat plaintiff in accordance
with the professional standards of his
specialty as a Board certified surgeon
. . . then you are instructed that said
defendant physician was negligent.
(R. 153)
The court further instructed the jury in instruction
no. 18 as follows:
You are instructed that a physician who
becomes licensed to practice his profession and who undertakes the treatment
of a patient impliedly represents that
he possesses, and it is his duty to
possess, that degree of learning and
skill ordinarily possessed by physicians
of good standing in the same or similar
communities. F.urthermore, if a physicians [sic) becomes Board certified and
undertakes to practice in a specialized
field of medicine, he impliedly represents that he possesses, and it is his
duty to possess, that degree of learning
and skill ordinarily possessed by Board
certified physicians practicing said
specialty in the same or similar communities.
It is the further duty of a Board certified
physician in the treatment of a patient to
use the judgment and skill and possess the
knowledge ordinarily used and possessed by
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Board certified physicians practicing
his specialty in the same or similar
conununities in order to accomplish the
purpose for which he is employed.

In determining whether Dr. Chambers fulfilled the duties imposed upon him as a
Board certified surgeon, you are not
permitted to set up a standard of your
own, but must look to the testimony and
evidence presented by physicians at the
trial as to what the standard of care
was at the time in question.
(R. 157)
The court permitted plaintiff's experts to testify
that they were familiar with the standard of care applicab!
to surgeons practicing in Salt Lake County and in similu
conununi ties and to express their opinions concerning that
standard of care.

In view of that testimony, the instruc·

tions as a whole leave no serious question but that the
meaning of the words "same and similar conununities" was
conveyed to and understood by the jury.

Under such ci~

cumstances, the court's refusal to give plaintiff's
requested instruction nos. 9, 10 and 13 which purport~
define "community" and "similar conununities" could not be
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prejudicial error.

Downey v. Gemini Mining Co., 68 P. 414

(Utah 1902).
POINT III
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
CONDUCT COMPLAINED OF DID NOT
PROXIMATELY CAUSE THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES
As a separate and distinct defense, the defendants
asserted at trial that the conduct of Dr. Chambers of
which the plaintiff complained was not the proximate cause
of any damage.
~

~

Specifically, the defendants maintained

that a reasonably prudent person in the plaintiff's position
immediately before surgery would have consented to the
procedure with knowledge of the additional risks that
Dr. Chambers allegedly failed to disclose.

In addition,

the defendants argued that the by-pass procedure and Dr.
Chambers' pre-operative and post-operative care of which
the plaintiff complained were not the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's renal failure.

The jury correctly decided

these issues in favor of the defendants in view of the
substantial evidence to support such claims.
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The court instructed the jury that to prevail on

t~

informed consent issue, the plaintiff must prove:
That a reasonably prudent person who
had been considering an intestinal
by-pass operation for weight reduction
would have ref used the operation if
such disclosure had been made by the
defendant.
In determining what a
reasonably prudent person in the
plaintiff's position would do under
the circumstances, you must use the
viewpoint of the patient before the
surgery was performed and before occurrence of any complications or
harmful results alleged to have resulted from the surgery.
(Instruction
No. 16, R. 155)
The court's instruction conforms to the universally
recognized rule that there must be a causal

relationsh~

between failure to inform and injury to the patient.
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1972);

Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.App. 3d 299, 104 Cal.Rptr.

505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972);

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act

Utah Code Ann.,§ 78-14-5 (1953).

The testimony of the

patient is not decisive because the test is objective,
not subjective.

Canterbury, Id. at 787, Cobbs, Id. at

11.
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In the present case, the plaintiff was morbidly obese
when he first consulted Dr. Chambers.

His treating physi-

cian and other experts who testified on behalf of both
parties agreed that he had a life expectancy of between
three to five years if his weight and blood pressure were
not brought under control.

(R. 433, 1164, 913)

Years of

efforts by specialists in internal medicine had failed to
achieve lasting results and the plaintiff admitted that
his efforts at voluntary weight control had never been
successful.

(R. 1041, 1047-48, 1129, 1139-40)

In short,

the need for treatment was urgent and among the limited
options available, the by-pass procedure had much to offer.
As Dr. Daniel Hunter testified:

Q.

Alright. Does the surgery, the
intestinal by-pass, does this
have benefits or expected benefits as to any of the conditions
you have just mentioned?

A.

Yes, sir. The weight loss itself
makes for a better quality of life
for these people. They are able
to get around much easier. It
does take a great load off the
heart.
It has very definitely
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resulted in lowering a blood
pressure in the majority of cases
that have been so treated.
It has
relieved diabetes for people who
have had this problem.
It has
helped the excess load on joints.
It has improved, in my opinion,
the health of many, many people.
{R. 1192)
The procedure had been used for more than twenty-five year:
as a surgical method to achieve weight loss and had been
the subject of extensive studies that were reported in
the medical literature.

{R. 1197)

By 1973, the procedure

was considered safe and appropriate treatment.

(R. 820-21,

1207-08, 1197-98)
The jury properly concluded that a reasonable,

pr~

dent patient in the plaintiff's condition who faced the
probability of impending death would accept the surgery
despite the remote risk of possible complications that
were as yet unknown.

As Dr. Hunter stated, the risk that

rare complications unknown at the time of treatment may
at some future date become known exists with virtually all
types of medical treatment.

(R. 1208)
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With respect to the contention that Dr. Chambers
should have informed the plaintiff of the nature of his
pre-existing kidney "problem", the evidence clearly
established that the condition was an indication for,
rather than an additional risk of, the proposed procedure.
(R. 1194, 1258, 1271, 1273)

The condition of hyperten-

sivenephrosclorosis was improved as a consequence of the
procedure and did not contribute in any way to the ultimate
kidney failure.

(R.

1273, 1277)

Finally, the jury also properly found that Dr.
Chambers' treatment was not the proximate cause of the
renal failure.

Dr.

Ch~mbers

examined the plaintiff on

a monthly basis and performed p~riodic tests of kidney
function throughout the post-operative period.

Renal

function was "excellent" through the end of December, 1974
and there were no indications of any kind to suggest the
possibility of kidney damage.
1333)

(R. 1274-75, 1268, 1287-88,

Without warning, renal function suddenly and ir-

reversibly declined.

(R. 1275-76)
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As a part of their treatment of the plaintiff,
specialists at the University of Utah Medical Center
performed exhaustive tests to determine the cause of the
kidney failure.

Dr. Allan Bloomer, a specialist in

kidney disease who heads the Division of Kidney Disease
in the Department of Internal Medicine at the University
of Utah, directed the effort and testified at trial as
his findings.

~

Microscopic, electron microscopic and

sophisticated immunologic screening procedures were
performed that failed to identify the disease process
that damaged the plaintiff's kidneys.

(R. 1255, 1278)

The plaintiff's case was unlike any other reported in
the medical literature, including the two reported incidents of renal failure following intestinal by-pass procedures.

(R. 1327)

The plaintiff was required to prove with a reason~~
medical probability that the renal failure was the resuU
of negligence on the part of the defendants.

It is not

sufficient to show that the kidney failure "might have" ~
"could have" resulted from such treatment.

Denny v. ~
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Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968).

The jury

properly concluded that the plaintiff failed to sustain that
burden.
In summary, the evidence clearly supports a finding
that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection
between any alleged misconduct of the defendant and the
ultimate renal failure.

For this reason, the jury's

verdict should be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS WERE NOT ERRONEOUS AS TO
MATTERS TO WHICH THE PLAINTIFF OBJECTED AT TRIAL
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
all objections to jury instructions are waived as to those
matters not specifically brought to the Court's attention
at the time of trial.

The Rule provides, in its pertinent

part:
No party may assign as error the giving
or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto.
In objecting
to the giving of an instruction, a party
must state distinctly the matter to which
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he objects and the grounds for his
objection.
The Court has strictly construed the provisions of Rule
51 and has consistently required specificity as to the
precise matter to which the party objects and detail as
to the grounds for objection.
In Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil
Co., 123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953), for example, the
Court refused to review challenges to a jury instruction
to which the appellant objected in general terms at the
time of trial.

The Court stated:

The objection should be specific enough
to give the trial court notice of the
very error in the instruction which is
complained of on appeal.
But an objection that an instruction is "not
supported by, and is contrary to, the
law" lacks specificness and does not
direct the court's attention to anything
in particular.
258 P.2d at 450.
The Court reaffirmed its policy of strictly construing ~
requirements of Rule 51 in the more recent decision in
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526~
47 (1974).

In that case, the appellants excepted to an
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instruction as "being contrary to the law and on the grounds
that it is confusing, misleading and does not comport with
the evidence and testimony in the trial."

Citing Employers'

Mutual, the Court held:
Since defendants failed to point out
with the requisite degree of particularity wherein the instruction was not
supported by the law, this court will
not consider the instruction on its
merits.
526 P.2d at 51.
In Dimmick v. Utah Fuel Co., 49 Utah 430, 164 P. 872
(1917), the Court also refused to review portions of an
instruction to which the party had not specifically objected
at the time of trial.

In that case, the appellant had

taken exception to only a portion of the instruction and
the Court stated:
Appellants' counsel, in their brief,
contend that the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial in other
particulars, but we find no exceptions
were taken in the court below to such
other portions of the instruction now
complained of, and therefore this court
cannot here for the first time consider
them as grounds for reversal.
164 P. at
874-75.

-39Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the present case, plaintiff made specific objections to instruction nos. 24 and 25 only insofar as
those instructions provided that the plaintiff had an
affirmative duty to make inquiries and to learn the natun
and cause of any injurious consequences of the defendant's
treatment.

(R. 1338)

In all other respects, plaintiff's

counsel simply objected to those instructions on the basis
that they were a "misstatement of the law."

(R. 1338)

With respect to those matters to which plaintiff's
counsel took specific exception, the Court did not err.
The statute of limitations in force at the time the
plaintiff's action accrued was Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-281:
which was enacted as Chapter 212, § 1, Laws of Utah, 1971.
It provided that medical malpractice actions had to be
brought
[T]wo years after the date of injury or
two years after the plaintiff discovers,
or through the use of reasonable dili~~· should have discovered the injury
. . . .
(Emphasis added)
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By the express terms of the statute, patients are charged
with the responsibility to make reasonable inquiry to
determine the nature, extent and cause of any untoward
consequences of medical treatment.

That duty was most

recently recognized by this Court in Foil v. Ballinger,
Utah Supreme Ct. No. 16071 (Sept. 19, 1979) where the
Court stated:
Another safeguard against tardy claims
is the requirement that a person exercise "reasonable diligence" in determining
the nature and cause of his or her injury.
Whether the plaintiff exercised "reasonable diligence"
in this action was clearly a factual question that was
properly submitted to the jury.

The plaintiff was entitled

to rely upon the assurances of Dr. Chambers only insofar as
it was "reasonable" for him to do so.

The existence of a

patient/physician relationship clearly does not entirely
absolve a patient from the duty to exercise "reasonable
diligence."
In all other respects, the plaintiff's objections to
instruction nos. 24 and 25 are raised for the first time
on appeal and need not be considered.
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CONCLUSION
The trial of this action was corrunenced on November 14,
1977, and was concluded more than two weeks later on
November 29, 1977.

An exhaustive effort on the part of

the Court, the parties and their counsel and the lay and
expert witnesses was made to present the facts of this
complex medical case to the jury in a fair and comprehend·
able fashion and to explain the law upon which the various
issues were to be decided.

Those objectives having been

accomplished, the trial court properly submitted all issues
to the jury for final disposition.

The parties receiveda

full, fair and impartial trial, and this Court should
therefore affirm the judgment entered on the jury's verdict
in favor of the defendants.
The jury correctly found upon proper instructions
that Dr. Chambers' treatment of the plaintiff was in all
respects appropriate and that his care did not proximaU~
cause the plaintiff's renal failure.

Throughout the tri~

of this action, the parties, counsel and the court knew th:'
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jury's decision on those issues, and none other, would
determine the ultimate outcome of this litigation.

On

appeal, this Court must presume that the jury found those
issues in favor of the defendants and since those findings
are amply supported by the record, the judgment of the
court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of November, 1979.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

· ental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-9000
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
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